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Abstract
We consider the problem of distributing a vaccine for immunizing a
scale-free network against a given virus or worm. We introduce a new
method, based on vaccine dissemination, that seems to reflect more ac-
curately what is expected to occur in real-world networks. Also, since
the dissemination is performed using only local information, the method
can be easily employed in practice. Using a random-graph framework, we
analyze our method both mathematically and by means of simulations.
We demonstrate its efficacy regarding the trade-off between the expected
number of nodes that receive the vaccine and the network’s resulting vul-
nerability to develop an epidemic as the virus or worm attempts to infect
one of its nodes. For some scenarios, the new method is seen to render the
network practically invulnerable to attacks while requiring only a small
fraction of the nodes to receive the vaccine.
Keywords: Network immunization, Random networks, Heuristic flood-
ing.
1 Introduction
The term “scale-free” is widely used to designate the class of networks that
have node degrees distributed as a power law [3, 12], according to which the
probability that a randomly chosen node has degree a is proportional to a−τ for
some parameter τ > 0. There has been a recent surge of interest in scale-free
networks, as a great variety of real-world networks, like the Internet, the WWW,
social networks, and scientific-collaboration networks, have been empirically
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observed to have node-degree distributions that approximately follow a power
law [9, 1]. In contrast with the classical random-graph model introduced by
Erdo˝s and Rnyi, whose node-degree distribution is the Poisson distribution,
therefore sharply concentrated around its mean value [8, 4], scale-free networks
normally contain nodes with a wide range of degrees, typically with a few nodes
of extremely high degrees coexisting with a plethora of low-degree nodes.
In this paper we consider the problem of preventing viruses or worms from
spreading on scale-free computer networks. The fact that node degrees are in
this case distributed according to a power law has profound impact on the way
the network operates. In particular, it makes the problem of fighting the prolif-
eration of viruses and other infections much more challenging, since the presence
of high-degree nodes dramatically increases the rate at which a virus may prop-
agate [14, 15]. For this reason, instead of combating the proliferation of a virus
in an already infected network, we consider a preventive immunization strat-
egy, which consists of distributing the appropriate vaccine to a small subset of
the network’s nodes, striving to immunize those nodes that can more efficiently
block the spread of a future infection. The goal of this approach is to distribute
the vaccine to as few nodes as possible while making the network invulnerable
to an epidemic, that is, to the occurrence of a state in which a relatively large
number of nodes is infected.
We can measure the efficacy of an immunization strategy by two indica-
tors: the expected spread, which is the expected fraction of the network’s nodes
that receive the vaccine, and the expected vulnerability, which is the expected
fraction of the network’s nodes that may become infected when the virus at-
tempts to infect a randomly chosen node of the immunized network. Clearly,
these two indicators are strongly influenced by how we select the nodes to re-
ceive the vaccine. A simple rule for choosing these nodes is to randomly select
a given fraction of the network’s nodes [2, 5, 15]. When applied to scale-free
networks, we know that this rule normally gives unsatisfactory results, as it
only achieves a reasonably small expected vulnerability for prohibitively high
expected spreads. An alternative rule consists of distributing the vaccine to all
the nodes that have degrees greater than a given value [2, 6, 15]. Despite being
more efficient for scale-free networks than the previous strategy, as it achieves
quite a small expected vulnerability with only a modest expected spread, ap-
plying this rule to real-world networks is known to be usually difficult [7]. The
use of this rule demands global knowledge regarding the location of the nodes
having the highest degrees, while the nodes of many real-world networks may
only be assumed to have information that can be directly inferred from their
immediate neighborhoods. Yet another alternative is to randomly choose some
of the network’s nodes and, for each of them, to immunize a randomly chosen
fraction of its neighbors [7]. This rule, however, and in fact the previous two as
well, seems hard to implement in practice on computer networks, since appar-
ently it requires that the vaccine be somehow transmitted to a given fraction of
the network’s nodes by means other than the network’s own.
In this paper, we assume that the vaccine enters the network at a single node,
called the originator. We attribute to this node the responsibility of starting the
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dissemination of the vaccine by initiating the method called heuristic flooding
for disseminating information in networks [16]. Let u be the originator. For
each neighbor v of u, this method prescribes that u forward the vaccine to v
with probability given by a heuristic function h(a, b), where a and b are, respec-
tively, the degrees of u and v.1 Each of the nodes that receive the vaccine, when
receiving it for the first time, proceeds likewise and probabilistically forwards
the vaccine to its own neighbors. By not requiring that the nodes of the network
have information beyond what can be inferred from their immediate neighbor-
hoods, this strategy can be easily used in practice. Furthermore, it represents
more accurately what occurs in real scenarios, since it does not rely on the prior
selection of nodes that characterizes all the three immunization strategies men-
tioned above, but rather assumes that the vaccine spreads out of a single node
(say, the very site of its development or the site responsible for its distribution)
via a heuristically controlled form of flooding. With this set of characteristics
that, in essence, make it independent of any network-wide properties, the new
strategy is to our knowledge the first of a kind.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section 2, we use a
random-graph framework and the formalism introduced in [10, 11, 13], whose
details are discussed as they are needed, to obtain mathematical results for the
aforementioned efficacy indicators. We utilize our analytical results in Section 3
to discover the properties that an ideal heuristic function should have to be
efficient. We then introduce a heuristic function that seeks to approximate
this ideal and therefore can be used to disseminate the vaccine. In Section 4
we discuss simulation results on random graphs having node degrees distributed
according to a power law. Our results reveal that this heuristic function performs
very attractively for the ranges of τ (the distribution’s parameter) that typically
are thought to hold for networks like the Internet. They also agree satisfactorily
with our analytical predictions. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Mathematical analysis
Let G be a random graph having n nodes, whose degrees are distributed in-
dependently from one another and identically to a random variable KG. We
assume that the nodes of G are interconnected in an independent way given
their degrees, which therefore remain independent. We base our mathematical
analysis of this section on the formalism introduced in [13] and target the case
in which G has a formally infinite number of nodes.
Let PG(a) be the probability that a randomly chosen node of G has degree
a, i.e., the probability that KG = a. The average degree in G, denoted by ZG,
is clearly
ZG =
n−1∑
a=0
aPG(a). (1)
1We assume h(a, b) = 0 if a = 0 or b = 0.
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Given that the degrees of two adjacent nodes are independent from each other,
the probability that some node’s neighbor has degree b is identical to the ex-
pected fraction of edges incident to degree-b nodes, which is given by
bPG(b)∑n−1
a=0 aPG(a)
=
bPG(b)
ZG
. (2)
From [10, 13], a necessary and sufficient condition for a size-Θ(n) connected
component to almost surely exist in G is that
n−1∑
b=1
(b − 1)
bPG(b)
ZG
> 1, (3)
which intuitively means that, given a randomly chosen node u of G, a size-
Θ(n) connected component exists almost surely if and only if a neighbor of u
is expected to have more than 1 neighbor besides u. When (3) is satisfied, we
denote the size-Θ(n) connected component ofG (its giant connected component)
by GCCG. Also, all the other connected components of G are small with high
probability, comprising only o(n) nodes, and G is said to be above the phase
transition that gives rise to GCCG. On the other hand, when (3) is not satisfied,
G is said to be below the phase transition that gives rise to GCCG and all of its
connected components are small with high probability, consisting each of o(n)
nodes.
Given a randomly chosen node u of G and a neighbor v of u, we define the
reach of u through v as the set of nodes that can be reached by a path starting
at u and whose first edge is (u, v). A node belongs to GCCG if and only if it
has at least one neighbor through which its reach contains a large, size-Θ(n)
number of nodes. Let q be the probability that a node has a small, size-o(n)
reach through a given neighbor. The probability that a degree-a node belongs
to GCCG is then 1− q
a, and the probability that a randomly chosen node of G
belongs to GCCG, which we denote by θG, is
θG = 1−
n−1∑
a=0
qaPG(a). (4)
The probability q that u has a small, size-o(n) reach through v can be obtained
from the probability that v itself has a small, size-o(n) reach through each of its
other neighbors (i.e., excluding u). Since the probability that two neighbors of
u have another common neighbor (i.e., besides u) varies with n proportionally
to n−1 [13], which for large n is negligible, the probability that v has a small,
size-o(n) reach through a given neighbor is also q, thus leading to
q =
n−1∑
b=1
qb−1
bPG(b)
ZG
. (5)
This equation can be solved numerically and then used in (4) to obtain θG.
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From now on, we assume that G is above the phase transition and, therefore,
GCCG exists with high probability. Furthermore, since G can be unconnected
and real-world computer networks are normally connected, we assume that it
is the graph induced by GCCG, rather than G itself, that models the network,
and also condition the remainder of our analysis accordingly.
2.1 Expected spread
In this section, we calculate the expected spread in GCCG, which is denoted
by Ps and consists of the expected fraction of the nodes of GCCG that are
immunized when a vaccine is distributed using the heuristic flooding described
in Section 1. We resort to the same method of analysis developed in [16]. Let S
be a directed subgraph of G that spans all the nodes of G. For a degree-a node
u and a degree-b neighbor v of u in G, the probability that the directed edge
(u → v) exists in S is given by h(a, b), the heuristic function employed during
the vaccine dissemination. Before proceeding to the calculation of Ps, we pause
for a brief study of S.
The neighbors of a node u in S can be classified into two different types:
the in-neighbors, those from which an edge exists directed toward u; and the
out-neighbors, those toward which an edge exists directed from u. If a directed
path exists starting at some node u and ending at another node v, then we say
that u reaches v in S or that v is in the reach of u in S. Note that, if u receives
the vaccine, then the reach of u in S is part of the set of nodes that become
immunized.
The connected components of a directed graph can also be of two basic types.
First, there are the weakly connected components, which are constituted by the
nodes that can reach one another by undirected paths, i.e., paths for which the
directions of the edges are disregarded. The other type is that of the strongly
connected components, each comprising a maximal set of nodes that can both
reach and be reached from one another.
Similarly to the case of the undirected graph G, there is a criterion for
deciding whether S almost surely has a size-Θ(n) weakly connected component,
commonly known as the giant weakly connected component of S, denoted by
GWCCS . Likewise, there is another criterion according to which S almost
surely has a size-Θ(n) strongly connected component, commonly referred to as
the giant strongly connected component, denoted by GSCCS . Clearly, when
both GWCCS and GSCCS exist, as we henceforth assume, all the nodes of
GSCCS belong also to GWCCS , and all the nodes of GWCCS belong also to
GCCG.
Since GSCCS exists by assumption, we can define two other size-Θ(n) con-
nected components of S, which we refer to as the giant in-component (GINS),
formed by the nodes that can reach GSCCS , and the giant out-component
(GOUTS), formed by the nodes reachable from GSCCS . Note that, by defini-
tion, the nodes of GSCCS belong also to both GINS and GOUTS . We denote
by θinS and θ
out
S the expected fraction of the nodes of G that belong to, respec-
tively, GINS and GOUTS . Figure 1 illustrates an instance of graph G having
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(a)
(b)
Figure 1: A G instance having a power-law node-degree distribution with τ =
2.1 (a) and one possible instance of the directed subgraph S of the G instance
(b). Part (b) also shows the nodes belonging to GSCCS (filled circles), GINS
(filled circles and triangles), and GOUTS (filled circles and filled squares).
a power-law node-degree distribution with τ = 2.1 (part (a)) and a possible
instance of its directed subgraph S (part (b)).
Assuming that the originator is randomly chosen among the nodes of GCCG,
the vaccine is guaranteed to be distributed to a size-Θ(n) set of nodes if the
originator belongs to GINS , which happens with probability θ
in
S /θG. When
this is the case, the nodes that receive the vaccine either belong to GOUTS ,
corresponding to a fraction θoutS /θG of the nodes of GCCG, or are not in GOUTS
despite being reachable from the originator, and then amount to a small, size-
o(n) number of nodes. Neglecting the latter nodes is equivalent to assuming
that nodes receive the vaccine only if the originator is in GINS . In this case,
only the nodes in GOUTS receive the vaccine and we have
Ps =
θinS θ
out
S
θ2G
. (6)
In order to obtain θinS , recall that the nodes of GINS are the only ones that
have a non-negligible reach. Considering a degree-a node u of G and a degree-b
neighbor v of u in G, we say that v is a dead end with respect to u in S if
either (u → v) is not an edge of S, or it is but the reach of u through v in
S is negligible, consisting of only o(n) nodes. Denoting by qinb the conditional
probability that the reach of u through v in S is negligible given that u is an
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in-neighbor of v in S, we obtain the probability that v is a dead end with respect
to u in S, which is
1− h(a, b) + h(a, b)qinb . (7)
And since the probability that v has degree b is given by (2), the probability
that a given neighbor of a degree-a node is a dead end with respect to it in S,
which we denote by wina , is
wina =
n−1∑
b=1
(
1− h(a, b) + h(a, b)qinb
) bPG(b)
ZG
. (8)
Because a node belongs to GINS if and only if at least one of its neighbors in
G is not a dead end with respect to it in S, we arrive at
θinS = 1−
n−1∑
a=0
(wina )
aPG(a). (9)
As a means to calculate qinb , let us consider a degree-b node v of G reached
by following a directed edge (u → v) of S. The reach of u through v in S is
negligible, which happens with probability qinb , if and only if all of the other b−1
neighbors of v in G (i.e., excluding u) are themselves dead ends with respect to
v in S. This clearly leads to
qinb = (w
in
b )
b−1. (10)
Equations (8) and (10) can be put together to yield another equation where wina
is a function of all the other win’s. This equation can then be solved numerically
to obtain θinS via (9).
We can follow a completely analogous derivation and obtain θoutS by noting
that a node belongs to GOUTS if and only if it can be reached from a size-Θ(n)
set of nodes. Let u be a degree-a node of G and v a neighbor of u in G. We
denote by wouta the probability that either u is not an out-neighbor of v in S or
is but the number of nodes that can reach u through v in S is small, consisting
of only o(n) nodes. Also, we denote by qoutb the conditional probability that the
number of nodes that can reach u through v in S is small, given that the degree
of v in G is b and u is an out-neighbor of v. In a way analogous to the one that
led to (8), (9), and (10), we obtain
wouta =
n−1∑
b=1
(
1− h(b, a) + h(b, a)qoutb
) bPG(b)
ZG
, (11)
θoutS = 1−
n−1∑
a=0
(wouta )
aPG(a), (12)
and
qoutb = (w
out
b )
b−1. (13)
Also, and identically to the derivation of θinS , we can unify (11) and (13) and
calculate the value of each wouta numerically to obtain θ
out
S via (12).
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Figure 2: The graph V that corresponds to the G and S instances of Figure 1.
Nodes represented by filled circles or filled squares belong to GOUTS .
2.2 Expected vulnerability
Consistently with the simplifying assumptions of Section 2.1, we keep assuming
that no node is immunized when the originator does not belong to GINS . When
this happens, all nodes of GCCG remain vulnerable to the virus, and if the virus
infects a node of GCCG it may propagate until the entire GCCG is infected.
Let us analyze the case in which the originator does belong to GINS .
As before, we assume that only the nodes of GOUTS receive the vaccine.
Let V be an undirected subgraph of G that spans all the nodes of G, and let an
edge (u, v) of G belong to V if and only if neither u nor v belongs to GOUTS .
That is, given a certain instance of the subgraph S, subgraph V contains all
the edges of G that are not incident to nodes of GOUTS . Clearly, the edges
of V represent the edges through which the virus may propagate if it reaches
either of an edge’s (unimmunized) end nodes. Figure 2 illustrates the subgraph
V corresponding to the G and S instances of Figure 1.
Once again, and similarly to the case of G, a criterion exists for deciding
whether a size-Θ(n) connected component almost surely exists in V . We denote
such a component by GCCV . When it does exist, and since all the other con-
nected components of V contain with high probability only o(n) nodes (which
we again neglect), a virus may only proliferate into a large, size-Θ(n) set of
nodes if it first infects a node of GCCV . This, of course, is predicated upon
the originator being in GINS and dissemination taking place exclusively inside
GOUTS , the assumptions of Section 2.1.
We define the expected vulnerability of GCCG, denoted by Pv, as the fraction
of the nodes of GCCG that may become infected when the virus attempts to
infect a randomly chosen node of GCCG. Let θV be the fraction of the nodes
of G that belong to GCCV . If the originator does not belong to GINS (which
occurs with probability 1 − θinS /θG), then Pv = 1; if it does belong to GINS
(with probability θinS /θG), then Pv = θV /θG if and only if the virus first infects
a node of GCCV , which occurs with probability θV /θG. We then have
Pv = 1−
θinS
θG
+
θinS
θG
(
θV
θG
)2
. (14)
Henceforth in this section we concentrate on calculating θV for the case in
which GCCV does exist. Clearly, a node of G belongs to GCCV only if it does
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not belong to GOUTS . Through the remainder of the section, let u be a degree-
a node of G that does not belong to GOUTS and v a neighbor of u in G. Given
that v has degree b, we define hb|a as the probability that the edge (v → u)
exists in S. Since u does not belong to GOUTS , node v must be such that
it satisfies one of the following conditions: either edge (v → u) does not exist
in S, which happens with probability 1 − h(b, a), or (v → u) exists in S but
the number of nodes that can reach u through v is small, which occurs with
probability h(b, a)qoutb . We can then express hb|a as the ratio of the probability
that the latter condition is satisfied to the probability that either the former or
the latter is. This leads to
hb|a =
h(b, a)qoutb
1− h(b, a) + h(b, a)qoutb
. (15)
Now let pb|a be the probability that v has degree b in G. Clearly, pb|a is
proportional to the joint probability that v satisfies one of the above conditions
regarding the existence of edge (v → u) in S and also that a node’s neighbor in G
has degree b. That is, pb|a is proportional to (1− h(b, a) + h(b, a)q
out
b ) bPG(b)/ZG.
Using (11), we obtain
pb|a =
(
1− h(b, a) + h(b, a)qoutb
wouta
)
bPG(b)
ZG
. (16)
Let b be the degree of v in G. Because u does not belong to GOUTS , nodes
u and v are neighbors in V if and only if v does not belong to GOUTS either. If
(v → u) is an edge of S, which occurs with probability hb|a, then v is obviously
not in GOUTS , as it would otherwise make u belong to GOUTS along with it.
On the other hand, if (v → u) is not an edge of S (with probability 1 − hb|a),
then v does not belong to GOUTS if and only if the number of nodes that can
reach it in S is small, which happens with probability qoutb . It follows that the
probability that u and v are neighbors in V is given by
hb|a + (1 − hb|a)q
out
b . (17)
When u and v are indeed neighbors in V , we define qVb as the probability that
u has a small reach in V through v. We say that v is a dead end with respect
to u in V if either v is not a neighbor of u in V , which occurs with probability
1 −
[
hb|a + (1 − hb|a)q
out
b
]
, or it is but the reach of u through v in V is small,
which occurs with probability
[
hb|a + (1− hb|a)q
out
b
]
qVb . Thus, the probability
that v is a dead end with respect to u in V is
1−
[
hb|a + (1− hb|a)q
out
b
]
+
[
hb|a + (1 − hb|a)q
out
b
]
qVb
= hb|aq
V
b + (1− hb|a)(1− q
out
b + q
out
b q
V
b ), (18)
so the probability that a neighbor of u is a dead end with respect to u in V ,
which we denote by wVa , is clearly
wVa =
n−1∑
b=1
[
hb|aq
V
b + (1 − hb|a)(1− q
out
b + q
out
b q
V
b )
]
pb|a. (19)
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In order to calculate qVb , notice that the reach of u through v in V is small
if and only if all other b− 1 neighbors of v in G are themselves dead ends with
respect to v in V . Then, assuming that the degrees of a node’s neighbors in G
remain independent from one another even under the condition that the node
does not belong to GOUTS , we have
qVb = (w
V
b )
b−1. (20)
Putting (19) and (20) together leads to an equation where wVa is a function of
all the other wV ’s, which can then be solved numerically for 0 ≤ a ≤ n− 1.
We are, finally, in position to calculate the value of θV . Let u be a randomly
chosen node of G having degree a. In order to belong to GCCV , node u must
not belong to GOUTS , which occurs with probability (w
out
a )
a
. Furthermore, u
belongs to GCCV only if at least one of its neighbors is not a dead end with
respect to it in V , which occurs with probability 1− (wVa )
a. It then follows that
θV =
n−1∑
a=0
(wouta )
a
[
1− (wVa )
a
]
PG(a). (21)
3 The heuristic function
The efficiency of heuristic flooding as a means of immunizing a network depends
heavily on the choice of the heuristic function h(a, b). Before introducing our
heuristic function, we elaborate on the properties of subgraph S that we may
expect to lead to good results for Ps and Pv.
First of all, it is clear that S must be above the phase transition that gives
rise to GSCCS , thereby guaranteeing that GSCCS , GINS , and GOUTS almost
surely exist. When this is the case, the nodes of GINS are the most suitable
ones for being the originator, as they can immunize a non-negligible number
of nodes. But since we cannot assume any prior information on the originator,
GINS should contain as many nodes as possible in order to make the probability
that the originator is chosen from outside it as small as possible. With regard
to GOUTS , we know that it contains the nodes that receive the vaccine when
the originator belongs to GINS . In order to prevent an excessive number of
nodes from receiving the vaccine, the size of GOUTS should be kept to modest
values. Putting these two observations together, we ideally want GINS to span
all the nodes of the network, GSCCS to contain only the nodes that can more
efficiently block the spreading of an infection, and GOUTS to be the same as
GSCCS .
Since we know that immunizing the nodes with the highest degrees is an
efficient way to prevent epidemics in scale-free networks [2, 6, 15], we introduce,
in this section, a heuristic function that stimulates the transmission of the vac-
cine to high-degree nodes. Introducing a parameter α ≥ 0, and considering a
degree-a node u that has the vaccine and a degree-b neighbor v of u, our heuris-
tic function h(a, b), which gives the probability that u sends the vaccine to v, is
defined as follows:
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• If b = 1, that is, v has no neighbor besides u, then h(a, b) = 0 and u
deterministically decides not to send the vaccine to v. In this case, since
u is already immune, should v become infected it can transmit the virus
to no other node, so we choose not to give v the vaccine.
• If a ≤ 2 ≤ b, that is, u has degree at most 2 and v has degree at least
2, then h(a, b) = 1 and u deterministically decides to send the vaccine to
v. This is meant to force some low-degree nodes to forward the vaccine,
thereby precluding a premature conclusion of heuristic flooding and, as a
consequence, leading to a larger GINS .
• For all the other positive values of a and b, we let
h(a, b) = tanh
(
b− 1
(a− 2)
α
)
. (22)
Figure 3 shows two plots illustrating this heuristic function for α = 0.7
(part (a)) and α = 1.0 (part (b)). Clearly, for fixed a > 2, h(a, b) increases
with b, so the vaccine is more likely to be transmitted to high-degree nodes. For
fixed b > 1, h(a, b) decreases with a, thus reflecting the intuition that, when u
is a high-degree node, sending the vaccine to v may be unnecessary even if v is
a high-degree node (there are probably other paths through which the vaccine
can be transmitted from u to v).
4 Simulation results
We have conducted extensive simulations on random graphs with node degrees
distributed according to a power law. Generating such a graph is achieved in
two phases [13]. Let u1, u2, . . . , un be the nodes of the random graph we want to
generate. In the first phase, for i = 1, . . . , n we sample the degree di of each ui
from the power-law distribution, obtaining the so-called degree sequence of the
graph. If
∑n
i=1 di turns out to be odd, then we discard the entire degree sequence
and sample a new one, repeating the process until the sum of the degrees comes
out even. In the second phase, we consider an imaginary urn having
∑n
i=1 di
labeled balls, the labels of di of them being ui. We then successively remove
pairs of balls from the urn until it has no more balls. For each pair we remove—
say, of labels ui and uj—we add edge (ui, uj) to the graph. This method can
produce graphs having multiple edges or self-loops, but it has the advantage of
generating graphs whose degrees remain independent even after the edges are
added, which is a core assumption of our analysis.
We carried out our simulations for n = 10000 and 2 ≤ τ ≤ 3. For each value
of τ , we generated 500 G instances. For each G instance, we used the heuristic
h(a, b) to both sample 1000 instances of the subgraph S and, in an independent
way, conduct 1000 vaccine disseminations by heuristic flooding from an origi-
nator selected randomly among the nodes of the largest connected component
of the G instance. For each S instance, we selected the largest strongly con-
nected component and calculated the sizes of the corresponding in-component
11
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Figure 3: Plots of the heuristic function given by (22) for α = 0.7 (a) and
α = 1.0 (b).
(counting the nodes that can reach the strongly connected component) and
out-component (counting the nodes that can be reached from the strongly con-
nected component). We then obtained the expected sizes of GINS and GOUTS
by averaging these quantities over the 500000 samples. For each vaccine dis-
semination, we calculated the fraction of nodes that receive the vaccine and
the fraction of nodes to which an infection may spread when an attempt at
infecting a randomly chosen node inside the largest connected component of G
takes place. We then obtained Ps and Pv by averaging these quantities over the
500000 samples.
Simulation results are shown in Figure 4 for α = 0.1, 0.4, 0.7, 1.0. We note,
in general, a satisfactory agreement between analytic and simulation results,
with the exception of part (d), in which case the deviation may be attributed
to the approximations made during the derivation of θV in Section 2.2 to yield
(21).
When τ ≤ 2.5, the plots for θinS /θG and θ
out
S /θG (Figure 4(a,b)) reveal that
the heuristic function introduced in Section 3 results in a GINS that spans
almost all the nodes of GCCG, while the size of GOUTS keeps to a relatively
modest fraction of GCCG. For example, for τ ≤ 2.5 and α = 1.0, the relative
size of GINS is always above 0.97 and the relative size of GOUTS is always below
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Figure 4: Simulation results of vaccine dissemination by heuristic flooding. Solid
lines give the analytic predictions.
0.13. For τ > 2.5, the relative size of GINS decreases with τ , thus evidencing
that heuristic flooding has more difficulty disseminating the vaccine when the
graph is sparser.
Owing to Ps being given by (θ
in
S /θG)(θ
out
S /θG) (cf. (6)), and to θ
in
S /θG being
relatively close to 1 (Figure 4(a)), the plots for Ps (Figure 4(c)) are of course
similar to the plots for θoutS /θG (Figure 4(b)). Furthermore, given a value of
α, Ps decreases with τ , which means that heuristic flooding spreads through a
smaller number of nodes when the graph is sparser, as, in this case, there are
less paths conducting to the high-degree nodes.
As for Pv (Figure 4(d)), we note that, for τ ≤ 2.5, Pv is nearly zero. This re-
sult is a natural consequence both of the guiding principle of the heuristic intro-
duced in Section 3, which ascribes more probability for transmitting the vaccine
to nodes having higher degrees, and of the result for θinS /θG (Figure 4(a)), which
indicates that GINS spans almost all the nodes of GCCG. As τ is increased to
values greater than 2.5, Pv moves farther away from zero, since the size of GINS
decreases and, therefore, the probability that heuristic flooding distributes the
vaccine to only a small number of nodes increases. Regarding the value of α,
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we note a clear trade-off between Ps and Pv. If we were to adjust α in such a
way as to decrease Ps, we would have an increase in Pv, which shows that the
number of immunized nodes has a direct impact on the resulting vulnerability
of the network.
5 Conclusion
We have considered in this paper the problem of immunizing a scale-free network
against a virus or worm. We introduced a new immunization strategy, one
that we believe reflects more accurately what happens in real scenarios. In
our strategy, we assume that the vaccine enters the network at exactly one
node, in general the site of the vaccine’s development or the site in charge
of its distribution, for example. This node begins the dissemination of the
vaccine by heuristic flooding, aiming at immunizing the nodes that have the
highest degrees. With this purpose in mind, we introduced a heuristic function
that gives more probability to forwarding the vaccine toward nodes with higher
degrees.
We obtained analytical and simulation results on random graphs having
node degrees distributed according to a power law. Our mathematical anal-
ysis has innovative aspects that we expect may shed some light on obtaining
analytical results for similar distributed algorithms. Also, we hope our anal-
ysis can contribute to the development of new heuristic functions for vaccine
dissemination. With regard to our simulation results, they show satisfactory
agreement with our mathematical analysis and highlight the expected trade-off
between the number of nodes that receive the vaccine and the vulnerability of
the network to future infections. Especially for power laws with relatively small
value for the parameter τ , our heuristic function achieves very good results,
making the network practically invulnerable to an epidemic while requiring the
immunization of only roughly 10% of the nodes.
We note, finally, that one possible direction in which this paper’s research
may be extended, in addition to the search for other heuristic functions, is that
of allowing for multiple concurrent initiators. While algorithmically (i.e., from
the perspective of flooding the network) such an extension is trivial, extending
the analysis of Section 2 is expected to be a significantly more complex endeavor.
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